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1.   Introduction 
 
In 2008 the Canadian government passed amendments to the Environmental Protection 
Act requiring five percent ethanol in transportation fuels sold in Canada by 2010 and 
two percent renewable content in diesel and heating fuels by 2012.  Agricultural 
commodity and other groups have lobbied for further marketplace intervention that 
would ensure the biofuel needed to meet the legislated requirement be produced from 
domestic sources.  Indeed, many of these special interests would like the biofuels 
content increased from five to ten percent and for the increase to be met by domestic 
firms only.  The objective of this study is to compare the relative economic impacts in 
Canada of achieving a ten percent biofuel content either through increased imports or 
by substituting domestic production in place of increased imports. 
 
The paper is organized into five sections.  The next section describes the classification 
of biofuels and existing policies for promoting their production and consumption in 
Canada.  The third section describes the analytical framework used to identify and 
quantify the effects of realizing a ten percent renewable fuel mandate through either an 
increase in imports or by an expansion of domestic production.  The results are 
presented in the fourth section.  The last section summarizes and concludes the paper.   
 
 
2.   Background 
 
Global biofuel production is increasing rapidly.  Total annual output of ethanol has 
increased to more than 60 billion litres in 2008 from fewer than 20 billion litres in 2001 
(Renewable Fuels Association, 2009).  Over the same time, the increase in production 
of biodiesel has been even more dramatic: a 900 percent increase from one billion to 
nine billion litres (Koplow, 2007).  While producers in the United States, Brazil, Canada 
and the European Union have been responsible for most of the expanded output, those 
in China, Thailand, Colombia, India and in tropical and sub-tropical regions have 
increased their production as well.   
 
Ethanol producers in Brazil enjoy a comparative advantage in production.  The vast 
availability of fertile land, favourable weather conditions and inexpensive labour create 
the economic circumstances that result in the lowest production costs worldwide.  On 
the foundation of inexpensive sugar derived from cane, ethanol producers in Brazil can 
make ethanol for $0.26 per litre, less than in any other region, according to the World 
Bank (Kojima and Johnson, 2005).  In general, production costs of biofuels (particularly 
ethanol) are lower in countries that lie in tropical and sub-tropical areas with low land 
and labour costs.  In addition to sugarcane in these areas, other crops such as tapioca, 
sorghum, and cassava have been used as feed stocks for ethanol production.  Palm oil, 
soybeans, peanuts, coconut, and jatropha have been used to produce bio-diesel.   
 
The comparative advantage of producers in tropical and sub-tropical countries provides 
an opportunity for specialization and increased trade.  However, like many other 
agricultural commodities, interventionism limits the scope of mutually advantageous   2
exchange across geo-political boundaries.  In North America, man-made barriers to 
trade including per unit and ad valorem tariffs reduce the quantity demanded of 
imported biofuel, and as a result, domestic prices are higher and world biofuel prices 
lower than they otherwise would be.  Delineating and quantifying the trade-offs from 
biofuel trade barriers, with particular reference to quantities demanded and supplied of 
biofuels both within and beyond the Canadian market, can supply useful information to 
help decision makers in the agricultural and energy sectors as well as in government.  
 
As is the case in many other countries, national and regional governments in Canada 
have implemented policies to encourage biofuel production and usage.  In June 2008, 
the Parliament of Canada passed amendments to the Environmental Protection Act (Bill 
C-33) that incorporated a mandate for biofuel consumption: an annual average 
renewable content in Canada of five percent in gasoline by 2010 and two percent for 
diesel fuel and heating oil by 2012.  Earlier, several provinces had implemented their 
own mandates of renewable fuel consumption: Ontario, five percent ethanol by 2008, 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan, five to ten percent starting when provincial production is 
sufficient, and Québec, five percent before the end of 2012.  If the opportunity cost of 
imported biofuel is less than domestically produced biofuel, eliminating import barriers 
ought to result in a less expensive means to realize these consumption mandates in 
Canada.  The relatively less expensive that biofuel is for final consumers, the more 
likely they will use it as fuel over available alternatives.  In addition to lower prices, 
imports diversify geographic sources of supply, which enhance the consistency, 
composition and quality demanded by final consumers.  If biofuels are truly to succeed 
as a motor fuel, they will have to provide superior value to final consumers either from 
being less expensive than conventional fuels for equivalent benefits, or by providing 
unique benefits for which consumers are willing to pay a higher price.   
 
To a large extent, biofuel use in Canada has increased as a result of interventionist 
policy initiatives, the economic consequences of which have been the focus of recent 
studies (Fridfinnson and Rude, 2009; Mussell and Martin, 2007; Klein and LeRoy, 
2007). Policy induced increases in domestic consumption have been met by 
government assisted expansion of domestic supplies rather than by a rise in imports.  
The interests of groups in Canada that have promoted this policy approach conflict with 
the interests of low cost foreign producers who also aim to satisfy the biofuel blending 
requirements in Canada and elsewhere.  While it is unlikely the Government of Canada 
will allow imported ethanol to realize much of the biofuel consumption mandate, regional 
differences in the opportunity costs of biofuel production provide the economic basis for 
increased cross border trade.  Moreover, the bigger the potential market for biofuel and 
the greater the comparative advantage of foreign producers relative to government 
supported producers in North America and Europe, the higher is the probability of trade 
disputes because of that government support.  To frame the empirical analysis that 
follows, the next section describes how the World Customs Organization classifies 
biofuels and the various policies implemented in Canada to promote biofuel production 
and consumption and to limit imports. 
 
   3
2.1. HS Classification of Biofuels 
 
The World Customs Organization (WCO), founded in 1952, is an intergovernmental 
organization that helps customs administrations in 173 countries communicate and co-
operate on customs issues.  The organization has established an international standard 
classification of commodities called the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding 
System (HS).  The HS system is used to classify goods for the purpose of applying 
tariffs and as such it forms a convenient structure for compiling worldwide trade data.   
 
To date, the WCO has no specific HS classification for either ethanol or biodiesel.  This 
not only makes it difficult to get precise biofuel trade flow data, but it also has 
implications with regard to reducing import taxes on them  (Howse et al, 2006; 
UNCTAD, 2006).  The source of these difficulties is the WCO lists biofuels as 
agricultural or chemical products, not as fuels.  Ethanol, listed under HS Chapter 22 
(beverages, spirits and vinegar) is considered an agricultural good, while biodiesel falls 
under Chapter 38 (miscellaneous chemical products) and is thus considered an 
industrial good. 
 
To make matters slightly more complex, ethanol can be classified as either undenatured 
ethyl alcohol (HS code 2207.10) or denatured ethyl alcohol (HS code 2207.20).   
Denaturation involves the deliberate addition of a noxious amount of a substance to a 
given quantity of ethyl alcohol to make the combination unfit to drink without impairing 
its usefulness for other purposes.  The change in its physical properties renders 
denatured ethyl alcohol a separate and distinct good from the undenatured variety.   
 
Of the denatured ethyl alcohols, ethanol may be classified as specially denatured (HS 
code 2207.20.11); denatured (HS code 2207.20.12); denatured, but not in accordance 
with the specifications prescribed by the Canadian Excise Act and Regulations (HS 
codes 2207.20.19); and other denatured (HS code 2207.20.90). There is no separate 
classification or sub-classification for fuel ethanol.  With regard to biodiesel, there is an 
additional classification problem:  many other products are listed along with it in HS 
3824.90.  Separating biodiesel from the long litany of other miscellaneous chemicals is 
problematic. 
 
Howse et al (2006) identified three issues stemming from the classification problem that 
need to be clarified in the application of WTO rules:  the determination of whether 
ethanol should be treated as an agricultural, an industrial or an environmental good, the 
determination of how ethanol subsidies should be treated in terms of existing categories 
of WTO subsidy rules, and the assessment of compliance of domestic rules with WTO 
standards on technical barriers to trade.            
 
The distinction between agricultural and industrial goods also has important implications 
regarding tariffs and the treatment of subsidies under WTO rules.  Annex 1 of the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture states that the provisions of the Agreement apply to HS 
Chapters 1 to 24 (except for fish products and a list of products with other HS 
headings). The Agreement on Agriculture not only has separate rules that affect tariff   4
rates but also different rules with regard to subsidies and other domestic policies that 
affect trade.  Thus, ethanol, an agricultural product, is treated much differently under 
WTO trade rules than is biodiesel, an industrial product.  This implies non-trivial 
differences in the application of existing WTO obligations related to issues such as 
whether subsidies directed to the biofuels industry could be viewed as providing 
downstream subsidization to feedstock suppliers (or vice versa) and whether or not 
biofuel subsidies serve as cross-subsidies for biofuel co-products.   
 
Further complicating the classification issue is the possible outcome from the Doha 
Round Negotiations that biofuels might be deemed as environmental goods.  If ethanol 
and biodiesel were classified as environmental goods in the ongoing negotiations on 
Environmental Goods and Services rather than agricultural or industrial goods, trade 
barriers likely would be subject to faster reduction. 
 
To date, preferential taxation, subsidies, import tariffs, consumption mandates and other 
forms of government support have been crucial to the expansion of the biofuels industry 
not only in Canada, but elsewhere in North America and Europe.  The consistency of 
these policy instruments with international trade rules requires a complex and fact-
specific analysis beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
 
2.2. Promotion in Canada 
 
On 18 July 2006, the Honourable Chuck Strahl, Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food 
Canada, announced the federal government intended to mandate that five percent of 
Canada’s transport fuel be renewable by 2010 and two percent renewable content in 
diesel and heating oil by 2012 on successful demonstration of renewable diesel fuel use 
under Canadian environmental conditions.  Then, on 3 December 2007, the Minister of 
the Environment, the Honourable John Baird Bill introduced C-33, an Act to amend the 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act (1999), in the House of Commons.  The 
passage of Bill C-33 on 26 June 2008 enables the federal government to implement and 
enforce regulations requiring the stated renewable content in transportation and heating 
fuels.   
 
Based on total use projections in Canada, the renewable fuel requirement could create 
a demand for 3.1 billion litres of ethanol by 2010 and for 600 million litres of biodiesel by 
2012 (Canada Gazette, 2006).  Table 1 shows that 16 commercial ethanol plants 
operating in Canada in April 2009 had the capacity to produce 1.338 billion litres of 
ethanol annually (Canadian Renewable Fuels Association, 2009).  Five additional plants 
with a combined capacity of 928 million litres annually were under construction 
(Canadian Renewable Fuels Association, 2009). For biodiesel and heating oil, the April 
2009 capacity was 166 million litres (Table 2).   
 
The increase in production necessary to meet the policy objectives for ethanol and 
biodiesel have led to a flood of proposed projects.  In Alberta, for example, the 
Permelex plant in Red Deer is the only commercial ethanol enterprise in the province as   5
of April 2009.  However, there are at least eight proposed projects in the province, of 
which Dominion Energy Services in Innisfail is the largest, at 374 million litres per year 
capacity (Riverstone LLC, 2007) and of similar scale as a mid-size plant in the United 
States.  While there are no commercial scale biodiesel enterprises at present in Alberta, 
at least 13 projects are at various stages of realization (Teel, 2007).  If all the proposed 
biodiesel plants are completed and operate at capacity, the quantity of biodiesel 
produced in Alberta alone will be more than twice the amount required to meet the 
national mandate.   
 
The policy induced increase in biofuel production in Canada can be traced back to 17 
December 2002 when the federal government ratified the Kyoto Protocol.
1  The 
prospects for the ethanol industry improved substantially after the government pledged 
$100 million for the sector as part of the means to realize its Kyoto commitments.   
Under the initial plan of the federal government, E10 blends (that contain ten percent 
ethanol and 90 percent gasoline) were to achieve a 35 percent market penetration by 
2010.  Berg (2004) estimated that this would have resulted in a replacement of 532 
million litres of gasoline or 1.33 megatonnes of CO2, just over one-half of one per cent 
of the 240 megatonne reduction in greenhouse gas emissions the federal government 
committed to achieve. 
 
Since 2002, domestic ethanol producers have received and continue to receive 
subsidies that encourage expansion of the industry.  In August 2003, the federal 
government’s Ethanol Expansion Program budgeted $100 million in grants towards 
capital costs of new or expanding ethanol plants.  After two rounds of competitive 
solicitation in 2004 and 2005, seven loans totaling $78.2 million were approved for a 
total additional capacity of about 750 million litres per year.  According to Fox and 
Shwedel (2007), repayment terms for these loans were lenient since repayments were 
contingent on net return targets.  A Biomass Ethanol Program also dating from 2003 
provided $140 million in lines of credit to ethanol plants in the event the excise tax of 
$0.10 per litre was re-imposed on fuel ethanol (which it was in 2007).   
 
On 20 December 2006, the federal government announced $345 million in taxpayer 
transfers to further expand biofuel production.  To encourage more farmer participation, 
$200 million was made available through the Capital Formation Assistance Program 
(which later was called the EcoAgriculture Biofuels Capital Initiative) (AAFC, 2007a).  
The remaining $145 million was directed through the Agricultural Bioproducts Innovation 
Program to promote research and development (AAFC, 2007b).   
 
                                                 
1 Policies to promote ethanol in the United States can be traced back to passage of the Energy Tax Act 
on 9 November 1978.  In response to rapidly escalating energy prices, the objective of this law was to 
mitigate demand for oil and gas by supporting energy conservation, fuel efficiency and the production of 
renewable sources of energy including ethanol, through taxes and tax credits.  During the same period, 
the policy response to high energy prices in Canada was the National Energy Program (NEP), introduced 
on 28 October 1980.  The NEP was designed to promote oil self-sufficiency, to maintain domestic oil 
supply for the industrial base in eastern Canada, to promote Canadian ownership of the energy industry, 
to encourage domestic oil exploration, and to increase government revenues from oil sales through a 
variety of taxes and agreements.   6
The 2007 federal budget provided $1.5 billion in subsidies over seven years for 
producers of ethanol and biodiesel.  Government assistance is available up to $0.10 per 
litre for renewable alternatives to gasoline and up to $0.20 per litre for renewable 
alternatives to diesel fuel for the first three years, after which the subsidies would 
decline.  In addition, transfers totaling $500 million over seven years will be made to 
producers of next-generation renewable fuels, such as ethanol from agricultural and 
wood waste products including wheat straw, corn stover, switchgrass, and wood 
residue.  The $0.10 per litre excise tax exemption was replaced by a $0.10 per litre 
producer incentive payment.   
 
In 2006, several provinces announced major biofuel incentive programs.  The Ontario 
Ethanol Growth Fund makes available up to $520 million available over the following 12 
years to ethanol producers.  The Alberta government announced a four-year, $209-
million Renewable Energy Producer Credit program that offers tax credits to ethanol 
and biodiesel producers and distributors.  The rate of subsidy is reviewed annually to 
ensure that it is competitive with other jurisdictions.  The Québec government 
announced a 24-point action plan to help realize some objectives of the Kyoto Protocol.  
Part of the plan involves a tax on producers of hydrocarbon energy during each of the 
following six years.  The government expects to collect $200 million per year from the 
carbon tax, which is to be transferred to a Green Fund.   
 
Tables 3 and 4 summarize federal and provincial fuel tax exemptions.  The 
heterogeneous nature of the tax exemptions (amounts, eligibility and duration) creates 
incentives that divert the pattern of trade from what likely would occur with a uniform tax 
code. For example, until recently almost all of the ethanol produced in Alberta was 
exported to the United States because Saskatchewan’s tax exemption applies only to 
provincially produced ethanol.  Meanwhile some ethanol produced in Saskatchewan 
was sold to buyers in Alberta where the provincial tax exemption does not place 
restrictions on the source of the ethanol.   
 
Table 5 summarizes how federal and provincial support has been extended to all stages 
of biofuel production from research and development to consumption.  Specific 
instruments that have been used for this purpose include excise tax exemptions, direct 
producer payments, interest free loans, grants, accelerated depreciation, consumption 
mandates and tax incentives for consumers buying flex fuel vehicles.  According to 
Lann et al (2009), between 2006 and 2008, total government support in Canada was 
between $860 million and $1.02 billion, averaging $300 million per year. 
 
2.3. Biofuel Tariffs  
 
Tariffs can be an important source of domestic market price support by limiting 
competition from foreign suppliers.  Table 6 shows that while tariffs on biofuels in 
Canada are low, those on ethanol (denatured ethyl alcohol) tend to be higher than those 
for biodiesel (a miscellaneous chemical).  The most favoured nation (MFN) tariff, which 
is extended to all signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, on 
specially denatured or denatured ethyl alcohol within the meaning of the Excise Act, is   7
$0.0492 per litre.  Importers of other types of denatured ethyl alcohol from MFN 
countries must pay either $0.1228 per litre or 6.5 percent, depending on the product.  
The federal government in Canada applies an exception (i.e., no tariff) on biofuel 
imported from the United States, Mexico, Israel, Costa Rica and Chile as a result of 
various bilateral trade agreements.  Biofuel imported from Brazil notably does not 
receive an exception. 
 
2.4. Pattern of Foreign Exchange 
 
Figure 1 depicts the quantities imported of various kinds of ethyl alcohol from 1996 to 
2006.  While biodiesel trade data are difficult to obtain for reasons explained above, 
data for denatured ethyl alcohol are not.  As there is no separate classification for fuel 
ethanol, imports in Figure 1 represent the maximum amount that could have been used 
for that purpose.  Annual imports of specially denatured ethyl alcohol (HS 2207.20.11), 
typically used as a solvent and astringent in toners, deodorants, mouthwashes and 
hairsprays, has varied from a few million litres to over 100 million litres.   
 
Ethyl alcohol denatured within the meaning of the Excise Act (HS 2207.20.12) may be 
used for a number of industrial purposes.  It is composed of a mixture of ethyl alcohol 
and specified denaturants that may be used in the production of ethanol-fuel mixtures. 
The best-known ethanol-fuel blend used in Canada is made with grade DA-2F, which 
contains gasoline as its sole denaturant.  The other two grades of fuel-denatured ethyl 
alcohol, DA-2C and DA-2G, have petroleum derivatives and diesel fuel, respectively, as 
denaturants.  The upshot is that HS 2207.20.12 is a good indicator of fuel ethanol, but 
other ethyl alcohols could be used for that purpose.  Indeed, prior to 1 July 2003, 
ethanols denatured with gasoline, diesel or other petroleum derivatives were listed with 
other specially denatured ethyl alcohol (under HS code 2207.20.11).  Since 2003, the 
quantity of imported denatured ethyl alcohol has been variable and falling from more 
than 100 million litres to less than 50 million litres.  Over the same period, imports of 
other denatured ethyl alcohols have been negligible. 
 
As there is more ethanol produced in Brazil and the United States than all other 
countries combined (Renewable Fuels Association 2008), it is not surprising that 
Brazilian and American ethanol producers are the major suppliers to Canadian 
consumers of foreign-produced ethanol.  According to Statistics Canada (2007b), most 
of the ethanol imported into Québec comes by ship from Brazil; in Ontario, most of the 
imported ethanol comes by truck from the United States.  Ethanol also is imported from 
the United States into Saskatchewan, Alberta, Manitoba, British Columbia and Québec 
(Statistics Canada, 2007b).  Less important foreign suppliers include those from Austria, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom (Statistics Canada, 2007b). 
 
Exports of denatured ethanol from Canada have been small compared to domestic 
consumption, and especially with regard to the quantity of ethanol exported from Brazil.   
Figure 2 reveals that annual exports from Canada between 1997 and 2005 ranged 
between 8 and 18 million litres.  Exports jumped dramatically in 2006 to 36 million litres, 
mostly because of increased demand in the United States.  According to Statistics   8
Canada (2007b), denatured ethyl alcohol was exported from only three provinces:   
Ontario (where most of the commercial distilling capacity is located), Alberta and 
Saskatchewan.  While the United States is a destination for denatured ethyl alcohol 
exports from all three provinces, exports from Alberta also were destined for South 
Africa, Iran and France.  Ontario was a supplier to consumers in Georgia, the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine, Japan, Haiti, Greece, Turkey, Israel, India, Germany and the 
United States (Statistics Canada, 2007b). 
 
Federal and provincial governments in Canada, like governments in other OECD 
countries (Steenblik 2007), have promoted biofuels using various policy instruments.  
With effective import barriers, biofuel prices will be higher in Canada than they 
otherwise would be and world biofuel prices will be lower.  This has important 
implications for the quantities demanded and supplied of biofuels both within and 
beyond the Canadian market.  While federal policies in Canada have been designed to 
impose a minimum five percent of Canada’s transport gasoline by 2010, some interest 
groups have called on federal and provincial governments to increase the mandated 
content beyond that level (Ontario Corn Producers Association, 2008).   
 
In the following section, an analytical framework is developed to assess the impact of 
two alternative scenarios:  [1] the impact of an increase in Canadian ethanol demand to 
ten percent of domestic liquid fuel consumption by 2011, met through increased ethanol 
imports, and [2] the impact of the same increase met only through increased domestic 
supply.  In the second scenario, ethanol imports are held at the baseline levels and all 
additional ethanol demand is satisfied from domestic ethanol sources at a higher 
“made-in-Canada” price.  To maintain the higher price for ethanol some form of trade 
barrier, tax exemption, subsidy program or domestic use requirement would be 
necessary.  While any or all of these trade barriers would be open to challenge under 
the North American Free Trade Agreement or at the WTO, identifying and quantifying 
their economic impacts is important given the political pressure to insure demand is met 
locally.     
 
 
3.    Model, Data, and Procedures     
 
3.1. FAPRI Modeling System 
 
A customized version of the deterministic Food and Agricultural Policy Research 
Institute (FAPRI) modeling system (Figure 3) was used for the analysis. The FAPRI 
modeling system is a multimarket, partial equilibrium model of dairy, grains, livestock, 
oilseeds and sugar that are produced, consumed and traded across key geo-political 
regions.  This modeling system provides a means to assess the consequences of policy 
changes as deviations from a ten-year projection of commodity supply and utilization. 
Since the models for each sector can be linked, it is possible to analyze how changes in 
one commodity sector affect other sectors and countries in the system over a specified 
future time horizon. Finally, and more importantly, the modeling system incorporates an   9
international ethanol model that includes important regional sources of demand and 
supply, including the United States and Brazil. 
 
Each commodity group modeled in the FAPRI modeling system includes the largest 
sources of demand and supply in that market.
2  World market clearing commodity prices 
in the model are obtained by equating world supply to world demand. For certain 
countries and commodities, domestic prices are solved endogenously as the outworking 
of the interaction of domestic demand with both foreign and domestic sources of supply. 
This means that within each country, the equilibrium price equates supply and demand 
in the domestic market. For the remainder, because the data is lacking, price 
transmission equations are used to estimate domestic prices as a function of world 
prices. Since the resulting domestic prices in the model do not equate domestic supply 
and demand, net trade is calculated as a residual (i.e., production – consumption + 
change in stocks). Various national agricultural and trade policies, which affect 
incentives of buyers and sellers, are included.  The maintained assumptions of the 
modeling system include: [1] that current agricultural policies remain in force in all 
modeled nations; [2] that average weather conditions continue; and, [3] that 
technological change continues at historical rates.  In each country, all prices are 
denominated in real terms in local currency.  
 
For this study, the international ethanol model was linked to a United States crops 
model and to an international sugar model through prices and trade. Both the United 
States crops and the international sugar models are partial-equilibrium models. The 
United States crops model includes behavioral equations for crop areas, domestic feed, 
food and industrial uses, trade, and ending stocks. The model solves for the set of 
prices that equate annual supply and demand in all markets. The international sugar 
model is a world model, where a representative world sugar price is solved by equating 
excess supply and excess demand across modeled countries.  The three models 
(United States crops, ethanol and sugar) are solved simultaneously to solve for 
equilibrium prices in United States crops, ethanol and ethanol co-products, and for 
world sugar. 
 
A baseline is established prior to evaluating policy scenarios.  This means that the 
models are solved to provide ten-year projections on production, consumption, trade 
and prices based on macroeconomic assumptions (GDP, exchange rates, population, 
etc.) and current agricultural, trade and ethanol related policies. Once the baseline is 
established, a specific scenario is run and the results are compared to the baseline. 
These scenarios include changes in trade and domestic policies or changes in certain 
variables such as crop yields and energy prices. 
 
3.2. Canadian Ethanol Submodel 
 
The Canadian ethanol submodel was developed and embedded within the international 
ethanol model. The country submodels are composed of behavioral equations for 
production, consumption, ending stocks, and net trade.  In addition to Canada, complete 
                                                 
2 More details on the FAPRI modeling system are provided at http://www.fapri.iastate.edu/models/.   10
country ethanol submodels are specified for the United States, Brazil, China, India, and 
EU-25. Because of limited data, only net trade equations are included for Japan, South 
Korea, and a rest of the world (ROW) region. 
 
The ethanol model solves for a world ethanol price by equating excess supply and 
excess demand for the product across countries. The model links domestic ethanol 
prices in most countries to the world price using price transmission equations, policy 
wedges and exchange rates.  However, in the Canadian submodel, the domestic price 
of ethanol is solved by equating domestic supply to domestic demand (see Section 
3.2.3. for more details). Specifically, the model solves for a baseline which provides the 
ten-year projections for Canadian ethanol production, consumption and trade given   
macroeconomic assumptions and current domestic and trade policies. The model 
solves for an equilibrium ethanol price which clears the market. 
 
Since ethanol price data were not readily available, a historical ethanol price series was 
constructed using the Canadian average retail gasoline price to estimate a wholesale 
gasoline price. The ethanol price was calculated as the wholesale gasoline price at a 
discounted rate. For the purpose of simplification, the Canadian ethanol submodel does 
not include provincial level policies and it assumes that ethanol is produced mainly 
through dry milling processes where the only co-product is distillers’ grains.   
 
3.2.1.  Canadian Ethanol Demand 
 
In the conceptual framework, the demand for fuel ethanol does not arise from the desire 
of final consumers to acquire and use it to satisfy their individual wants.  Rather, it is 
driven by the imposition of blending requirements which means, from the perspective of 
a manufacturer of vehicular fuels, ethanol must be a complementary factor of 
production.  The portion of ethanol used can vary, but it must be at least the legislated 
minimum. 
 
Within this policy context, ethanol demand in Canada is modeled as a conditional factor 
demand obtained from the cost function for refiners blending gasoline with additives, 
including ethanol. The cost function is  (,, ,)
CA CA CA
EG G S C C P P Policy Q = , where 
CA
GS Q  is the 
refiners’ output, which is the gasoline supply, 
CA
E P  is the Canadian price of ethanol, 
CA
G P  
is the Canadian price of gasoline (a function of the crude oil price), Policy is federal 
legislation that affects ethanol demand, and CA denotes the country of Canada. Under 
the constant-returns-to-scale assumption, the cost function can be written as 
(,, )
CA CA CA
EG G S CC PPP o l i c y Q =⋅ % . The marginal cost ( G MC ) of gasoline is constant as long as 
input prices are constant. Gasoline output 
CA
GS Q  eventually is determined by the 
intersection of gasoline demand and  G MC  at the equilibrium in the gasoline market.  By 
application of Shepherd’s lemma, the conditional factor demand for fuel ethanol, (
CA
E CP ∂∂ ), is    11
(1) 
CA CA











F E  is Canada’s fuel ethanol demand and  /
CA
E CP ∂∂ %  is the proportion demanded 
of ethanol per unit of gasoline.  The quantity demanded of ethanol per unit of gasoline is 
specified in the following equation:  













where  Policy is the requirement of ethanol blend in percentage. The proportion of 
ethanol per unit of gasoline,  /
CA
E CP ∂∂ %  is a function of the Canadian price of ethanol,  
CA
E P , the Canadian price of gasoline, 
CA
G P , and the proportion of ethanol in vehicular 




GD Q  denotes the Marshallian demand for gasoline in the Canadian market and 
is specified as:.  
(3)   22 2 2 2
CA CA CA CA CA
GD G E QP P G D P P o p αβ δ φ ϕ = + ⋅+ ⋅+ ⋅ + ⋅ , 
where 
CA
G P  is the price of unleaded gasoline in Canada,  GDP is real gross domestic 
product  in Canada is 
CA GDP , and 
CA Pop  is population. Consumers respond positively to 
a decrease in the price of the composite fuel, which is a function of the prices of 
gasoline and ethanol. The ethanol component of the composite aggregate fuel 
consumption increases as the ethanol price falls relative to the price of gasoline to 
capture the substitution between the types of gasoline at the gas-station pump.  In 
equation (3),  22 ,0 β δ <  and  22 2 ,, 0 α φϕ> .  
 
In equilibrium in the gasoline market, the quantity of gasoline supplied by refiners, 
CA
GS Q  , 
is equal to the quantity of gasoline demanded by final consumers (
CA
GD Q ), i.e., 
CA CA CA
GS GD G QQQ ==. Substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (1) yields the 
conditional factor demand for ethanol evaluated at the equilibrium of the gasoline 
market,  *
CA
F E :  
(4)      *1 1 1 1
CA CA CA CA
FE G G D CA
E
C
E PPP o l i c y Q
P
αβ φ δ
∂ ⎡⎤ == + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⎣⎦ ∂
  
At the equilibrium of the gasoline market,  /
CA
E CP ∂∂ %  can be interpreted as the share of 
fuel ethanol in total gasoline consumption ( * /
CA CA
FG D EQ ). 
 
3.2.2.  Canadian Ethanol Supply 
 
Ethanol supply in Canada is based on a profit equation expressed as return per bushel 
of feed stock (corn and wheat) net of energy cost. The net return for ethanol plants is 
calculated as the sum of the price of ethanol including the incentive to producers plus 
the price of the co-products in ethanol production (distillers’ grains) minus the cost of the   12
feed stocks (corn and wheat) and the other costs of producing the ethanol. This net 
return is expressed in per bushel of feedstock in equation (5). To account for the 
different feed stocks in ethanol production, the relative marginal costs for each 
feedstock are weighted by the share of feedstock in total production of ethanol in 
Canada;  CN s  is the share of corn-based production in total ethanol production, and  WH s  
is the share of wheat-based production. Thus, the net return per bushel of feedstock for 
ethanol plants in the Canada 
NET π  is expressed as: 
(5)  () ( ) () ()
NET CA CA CA CA CA
E E DG DG CN CN WH WH P I Ps Ps P m C P πγ γ =⋅ ++ ⋅ − − − ⋅   
 
In equation (5), I  is the monetary incentive offered to Canadian ethanol producers, 
CA
DG P  
is the price of distillers’ grains (a co-product in ethanol production from wheat and corn), 
CA
CN P  is the price of corn and 
CA
WH P   is the price of wheat.   CN S  and  WH S  is the share of 
corn-based ethanol and wheat-based ethanol in total ethanol production in Canada, 
respectively.  
CA CP  is the cost of production in Canadian dollars per gallon, which is 
multiplied by m to convert it to Canadian dollars per bushel. The conversion rates ( i γ ) 
are used to convert each price to dollars per bushel. The conversion rate for ethanol is 
2.64 gallons per bushel of feedstock and increases over the projection period to reach 
2.8 gallons per bushel to reflect changes in technology. All prices are expressed in real 
terms. Ethanol production (
CA Y ) is given as: 
(6)  33 31
CA NET
t YY αβ π δ − =+⋅ +⋅, 
where  1 t Y −  denotes the lagged production in million gallons. In equation (6),  333 ,, 0 α βδ>
.  Estimated parameters for the model are shown in Table 7. 
 
3.3.  Empirical Procedures 
 
For each scenario under investigation (i.e., achieving a ten percent biofuel content 
either through increased imports, or by substituting domestic production in place of 
increased imports) there is an excess demand for ethanol in Canada.  In the empirical 
model, equation (4) defines domestic ethanol demand and domestic ethanol supply is 
characterized by equation (6).  In the baseline and in the first scenario, where the 
increased demand from the higher (ten percent) mandate is met by increased imports of 
ethanol, net imports are calculated as a residual (consumption minus production) and 
the domestic price of ethanol is determined through a price transmission  equation, 




However, in the second scenario, where net imports are fixed at baseline levels so that 
the increased demand from the ten percent mandate is met by domestic production, 
prices are solved endogenously in the model.  In other words, domestic prices are 
                                                 
3 The model is designed to handle the case where the domestic price is lower than the landed price but 
this situation was never encountered.  
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obtained in the model by equating the sum of baseline net imports plus domestic 
ethanol supply to domestic ethanol demand.  
 
All the models were calibrated on the most recently available data (2006). Data for 
commodity supply and utilization were obtained from the F.O. Lichts Online Database, 
the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (FAOSTAT Online), 
the Production, Supply and Distribution View (PS&D) of the United States Department 
of Agriculture (USDA), and the European Commission Directorate General for Energy 
and Transport. Macroeconomic data were gathered from various sources, including the 
International Monetary Fund and Global Insight. Global Insight also provided projections 
for macroeconomic variables such as exchange rates, GDP and GDP deflators, which 
are used in the model to provide supply and utilization projections. 
 
Canadian production, consumption and trade data were obtained from USDA’s Foreign 
Agricultural Service Attaché Reports. The data includes both fuel and non-fuel ethanol. 
The crude oil price is the price of Lloyd Blend 22 crude oil obtained from Energy 
Information Agency and the Canadian gasoline consumption is the domestic sales of 
motor gasoline from Statistics Canada. The corn price is the cash price (in store, 
Chatham) for No. 2 CE corn
4. For wheat, the farm price is a weighted average of soft 
and durum wheat based on area shares. Both corn and wheat prices are from 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.   
 
Two types of analyses were conducted: static and temporal.  The static analysis 
involved a comparison of estimated impacts for the year 2011, one year after the 
current mandated five percent ethanol content would come into force, with a ten percent 
ethanol consumption mandate.   Projected gasoline consumption in Canada in 2011 
was based on Canadian gasoline consumption of 40.6 billion litres in 2006 (FAS, 2007), 
modified by arguments in the demand function for gasoline in Canada (Equation 3).  
Supply of ethanol to fulfill the ten percent mandate was modeled with and without 
additional trade barriers.  In the ten percent case with additional trade barriers, it was 
assumed that the level of ethanol imported into Canada would not rise above the level 
in the base case and all remaining supply would have to be provided by Canadian firms.  
In this scenario, the ten percent mandated consumption of ethanol by 2011 is imposed 
and the imports are fixed at the baseline levels with domestic producers fulfilling the 
increased demand for ethanol. Since ethanol imports are fixed, the model solves for a 
domestic ethanol price which equates domestic supply and demand. In the ten percent 
case with no additional trade barriers, it was assumed that as much ethanol as 
necessary could be imported to fulfill the ten percent mandate. In this case, the ten 
percent mandate is imposed and the model is allowed to run to determine the level of 
imports necessary to meet the additional demand. Imports are determined as a residual 
(consumption minus production) and the domestic ethanol price in Canada is 
determined by the price transmission equation (domestic price = world price + import 
tariff + transportation). 
 
                                                 
4 CE is an acronym for “Canada Eastern” and is used by the Canadian Grain Commission to differentiate 
corn grown in Western Canada from that produced in the East.   14
The FAPRI Model was used to generate a ten-year stream of production, consumption, 
trade and price estimates for all variables.  This facilitated the temporal analysis. Based 
on the 2006 starting conditions, the model was used to estimate production, 
consumption, price and other variables on an annual basis until 2016.  The baseline 
level of ethanol consumption was projected to rise from one percent in 2006 to five 
percent in 2010 (in line with the currently legislated mandate), then grow slowly to reach 
eight percent in 2016 (Figure 4)
5.  This baseline consumption path was determined by 
the model, i.e., the mandate was not imposed exogenously in the model. Rather, given 
the macroeconomic and policy assumptions, the model solved for consumption levels 
that reached the mandate of 5 percent in 2010 and increased gradually thereafter. This 
is in contrast to the scenarios, where the ten percent mandated level of consumption 
was imposed in the model meaning that the model did not solve for these levels. In this 
case, the ethanol content was increased exogenously from two percent in 2007 to reach 
ten percent in 2010, then held at that level until 2016 (Figure 4).  As in the static 
analysis, fulfilling the ten percent mandate could be done with and without additional 
trade barriers.  The impacts of each scenario are measured as deviations from the 
baseline for the years 2007 to 2016. The averages of these annual changes are 





The static estimates of Canadian ethanol production, consumption, imports and price for 
2011 under the three cases are shown in Table 8.  The baseline projection for 2011 
(where five percent of the gasoline supply is made up of ethanol), ethanol consumption 
in Canada was estimated to be 2.198 billion litres.  That would be supplied by 1.343 
billion litres of domestic production and 855 million litres of imports.  The estimated 
production is almost equivalent to the 1.338 billion litres of production capacity available 
in Canada in April 2009 (Table 2).  Of course, the model’s estimates are based on data 
that was available in 2006.  At the time of writing, taxes imposed on importers of 
biofuels remain in place and several ethanol plants are under construction in Canada 
(Table 2) – more than enough to satisfy the five percent mandate.   
 
A ten percent mandate for ethanol content would lead to an estimated consumption of 
3.996 billion litres of ethanol in 2011 if trade barriers prevented additional ethanol 
imports (Table 8).  This would come from domestic production of 3.141 billion litres of 
ethanol and the same amount of imports: 855 million litres.  If additional trade barriers 
were not imposed, Canadian consumption of ethanol would rise to 4.211 billion litres.  
With no increase in production from the base case (five percent mandate), all of the 
increase in consumption (2.868 billion litres) would be supplied by imports (Table 8).  In 
                                                 
5 Several baselines were developed and assessed before deciding on a slowly rising baseline (as shown 
in Figure 4). One possible baseline would have taken ethanol consumption to five percent in 2010 and 
then maintained it at that level.  However, with continuing interest and growth in the biofuel sector, 
especially considering the objectives and incentives in the United States Energy Independence and 
Security Act, it was decided that a baseline that grew slowly but steadily would provide a more realistic 
basis for comparison.      15
the ten percent case with trade barriers, the price of ethanol is estimated to rise to C$ 
1.13 per litre (Table 8), resulting in lower overall gasoline consumption than would be 
the case with no additional trade barriers. 
 
Results from the temporal analysis, where Canadian ethanol content in gasoline rises to 
ten percent by 2010, are shown in Table 9.  In the case where effective trade barriers 
prevent the importation of additional supplies of ethanol, the increased consumption 
must be satisfied entirely by domestic production.  Compared with the base, ethanol 
consumption would increase by an average of 1.016 billion litres per year over the ten 
year period (from 2.306 billion litres to 3.322 billion litres) – a 44 percent increase.   
Domestic production would increase, on average, by 69 percent.  Canadian ethanol 
price would increase an average of 48 percent over the period but would range as much 
as 90 percent higher in 2011 when the difference between the ten percent mandate and 
the baseline is the greatest.  Since ethanol imports would remain unchanged in this 
case, there would be no response in the world ethanol price and Brazilian exports. 
 
In the case where no additional trade barriers are imposed, annual ethanol consumption 
(over the ten year period) is estimated to increase by 1.119 billion litres per year (48 
percent over the baseline).  The higher consumption of ethanol in this case is a result of 
the imports, which keeps the Canadian ethanol price nearly unchanged from the 
baseline.   Because of the higher mandated consumption, domestic ethanol prices are 
expected to increase slightly (by about $C 0.01/litre) and world ethanol prices would 
increase by six percent (not shown in the table). In response to the six percent increase 
in world ethanol prices, domestic production of ethanol would increase marginally by an 
average of seven million litres per year (over the baseline).  To meet the expected 
average quantity of ethanol demanded in Canada of 3.425 billion litres, average annual 
imports of ethanol would increase 132 percent from 0.840 billion to 1.952 billion litres.  
The model projects that ethanol producers in Brazil would be the most important source 
of increased foreign supplies in Canada (not shown in tables of results).  Figure 5 
shows the temporal impacts of the increased import demand on the world ethanol price 
as estimated by the model.  The increased demand for ethanol over 2007-2016 in 
Canada would lead to a US$0.09 – US$0.18 per U.S. gallon increase in world prices in 
the short term relative to the baseline scenario.  The difference falls to about US$ 0.05 
per U.S. gallon by the end of 2016. 
 
 
5. Summary  and  Implications 
 
This study analyzed the effects of an increase in the demand for biofuels in Canada met 
either solely through domestic production or through trade.  The empirical analysis 
focused on ethanol because of the difficulty of sourcing and segregating trade flow data 
for other biofuels, most notably biodiesel. 
 
The results of the analysis show conclusively that import barriers favour domestic 
suppliers of ethanol at the expense of consumers.  Import barriers injure Canadian 
consumers by limiting their access to supplies offered for sale at lower prices by more   16
efficient producers, particularly those that are located in subtropical regions that face 
lower costs of land and labour.  With freer trade, the domestic ethanol price would fall 
while the world price would rise as a consequence of the higher demand for ethanol in 
Canada. Given their comparative advantage in producing ethanol, Brazilian suppliers 
would respond to the higher world price by increasing production and exportation of 
ethanol.  
 
This study shows that, while trade barriers isolate the Canadian ethanol market from the 
world market, freer trade would expand the ethanol market.  Tariffs and other import 
restrictions directly undermine the effectiveness and increase the costliness of a higher 
consumption mandate.  The relatively less expensive that ethanol is for the final 
consumer, the more likely those consumers will use it as fuel over available alternatives.  
The implication is that restricting imports of ethanol is counterproductive to the policy 
objective of increasing domestic ethanol consumption. The results of the study also 
reveal that eliminating import barriers would be costly for ethanol producers in Canada.  
In response to the lower prices they would receive, the quantities of ethanol they would 
offer for sale would decrease.     17
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Table 1:  Ethanol Plants in Canada, April 2009 













Husky Energy Inc.  Minnedosa  MB  1981  wheat   10 
Greenfield Ethanol  Tiverton  ON  1989  corn  3.5 
Poundmaker Lanigan  SK  1991  wheat  12 
Greenfield Ethanol  Chatham  ON  1997  corn  120 
Permolex Red  Deer  AB  1998  wheat  40 
Iogen Ottawa  ON  2004  wheat  straw  3 
Suncor Energy  St. Clair  ON  2006  corn  200 
Husky Energy  Lloydminster  SK  2006  wheat, corn  130 
NorAmera Bioenergy  Weyburn  SK  2006  wheat, corn  25 
Husky Energy 
(expansion)  Minnedosa MB  2007  wheat,  corn  120 
Collingwood Ethanol  Collingwood ON 2007 corn  50
Greenfield Ethanol  Varennes  QC 2007 corn  120
Terra Grain Fuels  Belle Plaine SK 2008 wheat  150




Aylmer ON  2008  corn  150 
Enerkem Westbury  QC  2009  wood  waste  5 




North West Bio-Energy 
& Terminal  Unity SK  2009  wheat  25 
Kawartha Ethanol  Havelock  ON  2009  corn  80 
Greenfield Ethanol  Edmonton  AB  2012  municipal 
waste  36 
Northern Ethanol  Niagara Falls ON 2011 corn  409
Northern Ethanol  Sarnia  ON 2011 corn  378




Greenfield Ethanol  Hensall  ON  2010  corn  145 




Okanagan Biofuels  Kelowna  BC  2007  wheat  114 
  Sources:  Canadian Renewable Fuels Association (2009); Laan et al. (2009).   22
Table 2:  Biodiesel Plants in Canada, April 2009 













Biox Corporation  Oakville  ON  2001  mixed  1 
Milligan BioTech  Saskatoon  SK  2002  canola  1 
Rothsay Montréal  QC  2005 





Canada  Mulgrave NS  2006  fish  oil  9 
Biox Corporation  Hamilton  ON  2007  mixed  66 
Western Biodiesel  Aldersyde  AB  2008 
recycled fryer 




Milligan BioTech  Foam Lake  SK  2008  canola  10 
Biodiesel Québec  St-Alexis-des-
Monts  QC 2008  recycled fryer 
oil  10 
Greenway Biodiesel  Winnipeg  MB 2009 canola oil  20




Kyoto Fuels  Lethbridge  AB  2009  mixed  66 
Birfrost Biodiesel  Arborg  MB  2009  canola  3 





Methes Energies  Mississauga  ON  2009  mixed  25 
Canadian Bioenergy  Edmonton  AB  2010  vegetable 
oils  225 
BioStreet Energy  Vegreville  AB  2010  canola  175 




BioNex Energy  Olds  AB    canola  20 
Canadian Bioenergy  Fort 
Saskatchewan  AB  canola  227 




Green Machine Biofuels  Kelowna  BC    mixed  1 
General Bio Energy  Regina  SK    veg.oils  200 
  Sources:  Canadian Renewable Fuels Association (2009); Laan et al. (2009). 
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Table 3:  Federal Tax Exemptions for Fuel Ethanol in Canada 
Initiative / 
Program 








1992       





Encourages the use and production of 
renewable fuels in Canada by 
implementing an exemption from the 
federal excise tax of $0.10/litre on ethanol 










   Eliminates the excise tax exemptions for 
ethanol and biodiesel. This measure is in 
accordance with the implementation of the 












Aims to boost Canada’s production of 
renewable fuels such as ethanol and 
biodiesel by providing operating incentives 
to producers of renewable alternatives to 
gasoline and diesel based on production 
levels and other factors. This initiative will 
make investment in production facilities 
more attractive by partially offsetting the 
risk associated with fluctuating feedstock 
and fuel prices. Incentive rates will be up 
to $0.10/L for renewable alternatives to 
gasoline and up to $0.20/L for renewable 
alternatives to diesel for the first 3 years, 
then decline thereafter. Incentives are 
available to eligible facilities meeting a 
minimum production volume 
(undetermined) constructed before March 
31, 2011, subject to program volume limits 
(2 B litres of renewable alternatives to 
gasoline and 500 M litres of renewable 
alternatives to diesel with a cap of 30% of 
program volume limits per facility) for up to 
7 years.   
 
Up to $1.5 B over 
9 years 
Source: anonymous reviewer. 
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Table 4:  Provincial Tax Exemptions for Fuel Ethanol in Canada 
Initiative / 
Program 





      Road Tax Exemption: $0.1375/L in the 
Greater Vancouver Service Region and 
$0.0775 outside of this region for ethanol; 
$0.1425/L in the Greater Vancouver 
Service Region and $0.0825/L outside of 
this region for biodiesel (provided the 
















Encourages the production and 
incorporation of bioenergy products 
(ethanol, biodiesel, biogas-electrical) 
within the marketplace; helps Alberta 
industry effectively compete with other 
jurisdictions that provide programs and tax 
exemptions to distributors who blend 
biofuels; and enables the introduction of 
renewable products into the traditional 
fuels and energy marketplace. This 
approved initiative is part of Alberta's Nine-
Point Bioenergy Plan and will replace the 
existing Alberta ethanol fuel tax exemption 
policy of $0.09/litre. Credits are given to 
producers of biofuels or biogas of 
$0.14/litre (production capacity less than 
150 M litres/year, up to a maximum of $15 
M/year) or $0.09/litre (production capacity 
of or greater than 150 M litres/year, up to a 
maximum of $20 M/year and total of $75 
M for the project). Those generating 
electricity receive $0.02/kWh (production 
capacity of or greater than 3 MW) or 
$0.06/kWh (production capacity less than 
3 MW). 
$209 M for 
renewable fuels 
$30 M for 
commercialization 







      Fuel Distributor Tax Credit for Ethanol: up 
to $0.15/L, 5 years, provided the ethanol is 







   August 
2007 
Provincial Fuel Tax Credit for ethanol: 
$0.20/litre, provided the ethanol is 






$0.15/litre, provided the ethanol is 





$0.10/litre, provided the ethanol is 




      Provincial Fuel Tax Credit for biodiesel: 
$0.115/L, provided the biodiesel is 
consumed in Manitoba. 










Provides 1) capital assistance (not 
exceeding $0.10/L of plant capacity) in the 
form of capital grants or loan guarantees 
for eligible new or expanding ethanol 
plants being built in Ontario to help meet 
financial challenges; 2) operating grants 
(not exceeding $0.11/L of ethanol 
produced in a particular year for a 
maximum of 750 M litres per year paid 
over a period of up to 10 years) to eligible 
producers in production from 2007-2016 to 
address changing market prices; 3) 
support for independent blenders of 
ethanol and gasoline; and 4) a R&D fund 
to pursue opportunities for research and 
innovation. 
$520 M over 12 
years            (up 
to $32.5 M 
available for 
capital assistance 





   December 
2006 






June 2002     Excise tax exemption of $0.143/L for 
biodiesel, provided the biodiesel is 












Variable Rate Income Tax Credit for 
Ethanol: up to $0.185/L, provided the 
ethanol is produced and consumed in 







   Tax refund of $0.162/L on the purchase of 
pure (B100) biodiesel fuel (> 3000 L) that 
is not blended with any other type of fuel 









   Motive fuel tax exemption of $0.154/L for 
biodiesel produced in Nova Scotia 
(biodiesel portion of blends only) that 
meets the American Society for Testing 
and Materials fuel-quality specification. 
  
Source: anonymous reviewer. 
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Table 5:  Types of Government Support for Biofuels in Canada 
 
Stage of Production 
 
 
Nature of Support 
Research and development Grants  and  low interest loans 
Business planning  Grants for feasibility studies and market development 
Plant construction  Grants and low interest loans, accelerated depreciation 
Production  Fuel tax exemptions, producer payments 
Price support  Mandated biofuel blending requirements and tariffs 
Distribution  Grants for storage and distribution infrastructure 
Consumption 
Tax breaks for the purchase of biofuel powered 
vehicles, government procurement and dissemination of 
information to consumers 
Source:  Laan et al. (2009).   27
Table 6:  Biofuel Tariffs in Canada  
Tariff Item  Description  MFN Tariff Applicable Preferential 
Tariffs 
2207.20.11.00 
Ethyl alcohol, specially denatured, 
within the meaning of the Excise 
Act, 2001 
4.92¢/litre  CCCT, LDCT, UST, MT, 
CT, CRT:  free 
2207.20.12.00  Ethyl alcohol, denatured, within the 
meaning of the Excise Act, 2001  4.92¢/litre  CCCT, LDCT, UST, MT, 
CT, CRT:  free 
2207.20.19.00  Ethyl alcohol, not denatured within 
the meaning of the Excise Act, 2001  12.28¢/litre CCCT, LDCT, UST, MT, 






6.5%  CCCT, LDCT, UST, MT, 
CT, CRT:  free 
      
3824.90.90.99  Miscellaneous  chemical products, 
other, other, other (biodiesel)  6.5% 
CCCT, LDCT, UST, MT, 
MUST, CIAT, CT, CRT:  
free 
GPT: 3% 
Source:  Canada Border Services Agency (2008).  
The Most-favoured Nation tariff treatment (MFN) is extended to all countries with which Canada 
has a trading relationship and which are signatories to the General Agreement on Tariff and 
Trade (GATT).   
 
The United States Tariff (UST), Mexico Tariff (MT) and the Mexico-U.S. Tariff (MUST) are all 
preferential tariff treatments under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The 
Chile Tariff (CT) is the preferential tariff treatment of the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement 
(CCFTA), the Canada-Israel Tariff (CIAT) is the preferential tariff treatment of the Canada-Israel 
Free Trade Agreement (CIFTA) and the Costa Rica Tariff (CRT) is the preferential tariff 
treatment of the Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement (CCRFTA).  
 
The General Preferential Tariff (GPT), the Caribbean Commonwealth Countries Tariff (CCCT) 
and the Least Developed Country Tariff (LDCT) are tariff treatments unilaterally extended to 
countries that have unique geo-political or economic conditions to which the federal government 
in Canada has chosen to apply reduced rates of duties.  
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Table 7:  Estimated Model Elasticities 
Elasticity
Ethanol Production (Equation 6) 
   Real Net Profit (from Equation 5)  0.30
   Lagged production 0.13
Share of Ethanol Fuel Consumption (Equation 2)  
   Real Ethanol Price  -0.41
   Real Gasoline Price   0.24
GASOLINE CONSUMPTION (Equation 3) 
   Real Gasoline Price   -0.11
   Real Ethanol Price  -0.04
   GDP  0.13
   Population  0.11
Net Imports of Ethanol 
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Table 8:  Impacts of an Increase in Canadian Ethanol Demand, With and Without 
Trade Barriers, Static Analysis for 2011 (Million Litres) 
 
Ethanol share 
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Table 9: Summary Results of Temporal Analysis: Estimated Canadian Ethanol 
Prices, Production, Consumption and Net Imports, 2006-2016 
 
Year  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Avg. 
 
Ethanol  Price 
 
(C$/litre) 
    Baseline  0.59 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.66 0.62 0.59 0.56 0.54 0.51 0.63 
  Trade Barriers   0.59  0.62  0.79  0.92  1.08 1.25 1.12 1.04 0.96 0.85 0.74 0.88 




(millions of litres) 
    Baseline  337  313  584  851 1087 1343 1599 1857 2115 2349 2566 1466 
    Trade  Barriers    337  339 1011 1665 2373 3141 3202 3245 3283 3289 3270 2482 




(millions of litres) 
    Baseline  380  783 1183 1599 1923 2198 2479 2768 3064 3373 3692 2306 
    Trade  Barriers    380  810 1610 2414 3209 3996 4082 4156 4232 4313 4396 3322 




(millions of litres) 
    Baseline  43 471 599 748 836 855 880 911 949  1025  1126 840 
    Trade  Barriers    43 471 599 748 836 855 880 911 949  1025  1126 840 
    No  Trade  Barriers  43  498 1049 1625 2248 2868 2655 2447 2239 2025 1865 1952 






































Figure 2:  Canadian Exports of Denatured Ethyl Alcohol, Any Strength, in Millions 
of Litres, 1997-2006 
 















Source:  Elobeid and Tokgoz (2006).    
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Figure 4:  Maintained Assumptions about Increased Consumption of Ethanol 
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Figure 5:  Impacts of an Increase in Canadian Ethanol Demand, With Increased 
Trade, on the World Ethanol Price (Scenario 1) 




















Baseline With Increased Trade